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IMPACTS OF POLICY REFORMS ON LABOR MIGRATION 
FROM RURAL MEXICO TO THE UNITED STATES 
 
Immigrant workers from Mexico are a critical component of the supply of labor to 
agriculture and many non-agricultural sectors in the United States. They constitute 3.5 
percent of U.S. labor force but are heavily concentrated into two types of sectors. 
Twenty-five percent are in services, and twenty-nine percent are involved in production 
and transportation occupations (Grieco and Ray, 2004).  However, the majority of 
farmworkers are Mexico-born.  According to the National Agricultural Worker Survey 
(NAWS), Mexico-born persons represented an estimated 77 percent of the U.S. farm 
workforce in 1997-98 (up from 57 percent in 1990; U.S. Department of Labor, 2000 and 
1991).  The majority of these workers (52 percent) were unauthorized. An overwhelming 
majority originate from households in rural Mexico (U.S. Commission on Immigration 
Reform, 1997).   
Two major policy changes, The North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), together with 
intensified enforcement along the southern U.S. border, were aimed wholly or partially at 
curtailing the flow of unauthorized Mexico-to-U.S. migration. The curtailment of 
unauthorized migration had the potential to reduce the supply of labor to these U.S. 
economic sectors.  But these policies had potentially counteracting effects.  The overall 
impact of NAFTA, IRCA and increased border enforcement on migration is theoretically 
ambiguous and therefore must be estimated econometrically.   
In this paper, we estimate a dynamic econometric model to test the effect of these 
policy changes on the flow of migrant labor from rural Mexico to the United States.  
Recognizing that policy changes may have differential effects on male and female labor 
migration, we estimate the effects of policy changes by the gender of migrant flows, as 
well.  The models are estimated using retrospective data from the 2003 National Mexico 




Given individual, household and community characteristics, policy changes may alter the 
larger milieu within which migration decisions take place.  In this paper we isolate the 
impact of three policies, IRCA, NAFTA and increased expenditure on enforcement along 
the U.S.-Mexican border.   Each of these policies has counteracting effects on migration, 
making the overall impact on migration ambiguous. 
IRCA had two main components.  First, it made employers who hired illegal 
aliens subject to fines and/or imprisonment.  These penalties were meant to discourage 
the hiring of unauthorized immigrants and reduce migration by dampening the 
employment expectations of migrants.  Second, IRCA provided amnesty to illegal aliens 
who have lived in the U.S. continually since 1982, if they applied before 1988.  This 
policy legalized U.S. migration contacts for households throughout rural Mexico.  In so 
doing, it may have encouraged migration by family members of newly legalized 
migrants, while also sending a signal to rural Mexicans that future amnesty deals might 
be forthcoming.  Therefore, these two components of IRCA potentially have 
counteracting effects on immigration.   3 
NAFTA was only partially motivated by migration concerns but was expected to 
have far-reaching impacts on migration flows.  In the long run, trade liberalization 
policies open North American markets to Mexico, encouraging export of goods and 
decreasing migration pressures.
1  That is, in the long run, trade and migration may be 
substitutes.  After Mexico joined NAFTA, Mexican agricultural exports to the United 
States did, indeed, increase.  However, in the short run, NAFTA could displace rural 
workers as production shifts from importables to exportables and labor markets adjust to 
new market realities.  Computable general equilibrium models predicted that the increase in 
labor demand generated by exports to the United States would be insufficient to absorb 
workers displaced from agricultural activities that had been protected by government 
policies prior to NAFTA.  This, in turn, would stimulate out-migration from rural Mexico 
(Levy and and van Wijnberger: 1992, and Robinson et.al.: 1991).   
The process of dismantling protectionist agrarian policies, which began just prior to 
NAFTA, was also expected to displace agricultural workers throughout Mexico.  Mexico 
phased out price supports for eleven agricultural field crops and the processing, storing, and 
marketing activities of the state-run National Company of Popular Subsistence 
(CONASUPO, Yunez-Naude: 2003).  Agricultural credit subsidies were also reduced 
sharply (Yunez and Barceinas: 2004).  For rural workers displaced by policies related to 
NAFTA, migration may have been a vehicle to overcome short term financial shocks.     
The third policy that we evaluate is the increase in enforcement along the U.S. - 
Mexico border.  Increases in border enforcement were meant to curtail unauthorized 
immigration.  However, they could have the opposite effect, by discouraging 
unauthorized immigrants from returning to their home countries and thus extending their 
stays in the United States.   Increased border enforcement raises smuggler fees, but 
family members may be willing to pay the increased cost in order to reunite with relatives 
who have extended stays in the United States.    
The possible impacts of these three policies on migration are complex and 
theoretically ambiguous.  The net effects of these policy shocks on the migration of labor 
from rural Mexico to the United States can only be determined empirically.  However, in 
order to isolate the effects of policy changes on migration we also need to control for the 
plethora of individual, household and community variables influencing migration 
decisions over time, as well as macroeconomic shocks that affect the migration decision. 
Individual, household and community variables affect the costs and benefits of 
migrating relative to staying at home and thus the propensity to migrate.  The propensity 
to migrate and obtain employment in the United States is partly a function of migration 
networks and sending-area characteristics.  Sending-area characteristics and community 
level heterogeneity are controlled for econometrically via fixed effects, while migration 
networks or contacts with employed migrants in the United States are represented by 
lagged stocks of employed villagers in the United States.   Networks may be gender-
specific.  For example, females may base their migration decision on the knowledge that 
other females in the village have succeeded in crossing the border and obtaining 
employment in the United States.  In order to evaluate gender-specific network effects we 
include separately the lagged stocks of male and female villagers employed in the United 
States. 
                                                 
1 Presidents Salinas and Bush (Senior) argued this point to gain support for NAFTA.     4 
Several macroeconomic variables also may influence the benefits and costs of 
international migration.  These variables include changes in the peso-dollar exchange rate 
and in per-capita GDPs of both countries.  Mexican currency devaluations increase the 
purchasing power of dollars remitted in Mexico.  Changes in U.S. GDP are included as a 
proxy for the availability of jobs in the United States.  They are expected to be positively 
related to migration.  The impact of an increase in Mexico’s GDP is ambiguous. On one 
hand, it could reflect employment growth that discourages migration.  On the other hand, 
higher income in Mexico could provide households with the liquidity to finance 
investments, including investments in international migration, i.e., the costs associated 
with crossing the U.S.-Mexican border and establishing oneself in a foreign labor market.  
Our econometric analysis controls explicitly for these variables in order to isolate the 
impact of our three policy variables.  
 
Theoretical Model   
 
At the micro level, international migration is only observed for households and family 
members that choose to participate in migration, which is a discrete decision.  Migrants 
are individuals for whom the expected benefits of migration, R, exceed the (unobserved) 
migration “reservation wage,” w.  The migration reservation wage depends on local 
opportunities on and off the farm.  Following Mincer, the local wage is a function of 
human capital that affects the marginal productivity of labor.  Let XW denote a vector of 
human capital characteristics influencing wage income in the local labor market.  The 
productivity of family members’ on local farm and off-farm activities is shaped both by 
these human capital variables and by family assetsK . Remittances are a function of 
migrants’ human capital, which affects earnings, as well as migrants’ motivations to 
remit, which may be influenced by both human capital and family assets (Lucas and 
Stark, Taylor, 1985).  Contacts at migrant destinations, K M , are a form of migration 
capital that can enhance the labor-market prospects of migrants (Munshi, 2003). 
Migrant remittances and reservation wages have both deterministic and stochastic 
components; thus,   u X R R R + = ) (  and  v X + = ) ( v v v , where  ] , [ K X X W = v , 
] , , [ K M K X X W R = , and u  and v are stochastic errors.  Letting  i d = 1 if household 
member i migrates and 0 otherwise, the migration participation decision becomes:   
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where  i i i u v - = h .  Total migration is simply the sum of individuals who migrate; that is, 
￿ =
i
i M d .  Let  t q  represent the joint distribution of variables  R X  and  v X  in 
community j at time t. Then  
(2)          ) , ( jt jt jt Z M M q =  
where  jt Z  is a vector of community variables influencing the productivity of labor in 
local activities and remittances. In the econometric model, we control for the influences 
of  jt q  and  jt Z  by including lagged migration ( 1 , - t j M ), fixed effects for communities, and 
a time trend.   5 
Data 
 
The data used to estimate the model are from a nationwide rural household survey carried 
out jointly by El Colegio de Mexico and the University of California, Davis.  The Mexico 
National Rural Household Survey (Encuesta Nacional a Hogares Rurales de Mexico, or 
ENHRUM) provides retrospective data on migration by individuals from a sample of 
rural households that is both nationally and regionally representative (see 
http://precesam.colmex.mx).  Past studies of Mexican labor supply to the U.S. 
employment sectors used proxies including border apprehensions (e.g., Torok and 
Huffman: 1986) or data from surveys of small numbers of villages.   Usually surveys 
have not collected migration flows over extended periods of times and thus are unable to 
evaluate policies’ long-term impact on the dynamics and trends of migration. We hope 
that our dataset will fill this lacuna in the literature.   
The ENHRUM was carried out in January and February 2003 in all of Mexico’s 
five census regions (See Figure 1).  INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía 
e Informática), Mexico’s national census office, designed the sampling frame to provide 
a statistically reliable characterization of Mexico’s population living in rural areas, 
defined by INEGI as communities with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants.  The survey was 
designed to be representative both nationally and regionally. Rural households were 
selected via a three-tiered stratified random sampling method involving states, 
communities, and households randomly drawn within each community.  This method 
generated a sample of 1,782 households in 80 villages and 14 Mexican states.  For 
reasons of cost and tractability, individuals in hamlets or disperse populations with fewer 
than 500 inhabitants were not included in the survey.  The sample is representative of 
more than 80 percent of the population that the Mexican census office considers to be 
rural. 
The ENHRUM survey assembled complete migration histories from 1980 through 
2002 for (a) the household head, (b) the spouse of the head, (c) all individuals who lived 
in the household 3 months or more in 2002, and (d) a random sample of sons and 
daughters of either the head or his/her spouse who lived outside the household longer 
than 3 months in 2002. In theory, the ENHRUM survey collected retrospective 
information only about labor migrants.
2  However, data on place of residence of all 
family members were gathered for 2002, regardless of employment status.  For 2002, 
virtually all migrants were considered by family members in the village to be labor 
migrants.  If the same is true for earlier years, our counts of labor migrants will also 
reflect total migration.  For each year, the survey provides information on the migrant’s 
sector of employment, agricultural or non-agricultural, and the state in which he/she 
worked.   The survey provides the most reliable longitudinal data on migration from rural 
Mexican communities to the United States.   
The survey asked individuals to recall employment information for each migrant 
from 1980-2002.  Individuals may be unable to remember their (or their migrant sons’ 
and daughters’) employment histories for 22 years.  However, when employment is 
coupled with a life event such as international migration, there is a smaller likelihood that 
                                                 
2 The questions asked in the survey were:  “¿Qué años trabajó ___ en los E.U. desde 1980? ¿En qué trabajó 
y en qué estado? ¿Por un salario o por cuenta propia?”  (“In what years did ___ work in the U.S. since 
1980?  In what job and which state?  For a salary or self-employed?”).   6 
data will be misreported.  A study by Smith and Thomas (2003) showed that when 
respondents are asked to recall information linked to salient events, such as marriage or 
birth of a child, misreporting is insignificant.  Also, individuals asked to recall labor or 
migration histories reported more accurately moves that involved either a long distance or 
extended stays.   
To implement the survey, Mexico was divided into 5 regions, reflecting INEGI’s 
standard regionalization of the country:  Center, South-Southeast, Center-West, 
Northwest, and Northeast.
3  Table 1 summarizes migration from households in rural 
Mexico.  Sixteen percent of all households in the sample had a family member living in 
the United States at the start of 2002, the year of the survey, and 26 percent had a family 
member living in another part of Mexico.  Many households had more than one migrant.  
The number of U.S. migrants per household ranged from 0 to 9, while the number of 
internal migrants ranged from 0 to 10.  The average household in the sample had 0.35 
U.S. migrants and 0.71 internal migrants in 2002—or 1.06 migrants in total.   
As indicated in the Table, there are sharp differences in migration experience 
among the five rural regions.  West-Central Mexico traditionally has been the largest 
sender of migrants to the United States, with far and away the highest current 
participation in international migration and the most international migration experience.  
In this region, nearly 28% of all households have at least one family member in the 
United States, and the average household had .62 U.S. migrants.  By contrast, 7.5% of 
households in the south-southwest have U.S. migrants, with an average of .10 U.S. 




We econometrically estimate the impact of policy reforms for three dependent variables: 
1) the share of villagers employed in the U.S.; 2) the share of female villagers employed 
in the U.S.; and 3) the share of male villagers employed in the U.S.    
For the first dependent variable we estimate two fixed-effects panel data models 
for all employed immigrants.  The first model is intended to capture the basic dynamics 
of rural Mexico-to-U.S. migration.  The share of village population observed as labor 
migrants in the Untied States at time t, Mt, is regressed on the same share lagged one year 
( ) 1 jt M - and a time trend (t), controlling for a vector of village fixed effects, aj:
4 
(3a)        jt jt j jt u M t M + + + = -1 d g a  
Essentially, equation (3a) estimates the dynamic nature of employed migration over time 
and allows us to evaluate the role of networks and the inertia of employed migration over 
time.  Village fixed effects, j a , control for community-specific migration dynamics that 
                                                 
3 The high-migration West-Central region was the focus of Mexico Migration Project (MMP) surveys 
(Population Studies Center, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia (producer and distributor), 
www.pop.upenn.edu/mexmig/welcome.html).  The MMP surveyed a random sample of households within 
communities, but the sample of MMP communities was not random.   
4  We use the percentage rather than the sum of villagers who migrated because of our concern that the size 
of village populations in the synthetic cohorts created using retrospective data is biased downward as one 
goes back in time, as individuals are removed from the population due to death (and thus are not available 
to be counted in 2003).     7 
shape the migration trend; each village is permitted to have its own migration trajectory.  
The village fixed-effects model makes it possible to isolate the underlying migration 
trend (t) and influence of networks and inertia (the lagged-migration variable) from 
policy and macroeconomic variables shaping migration.  
Model two includes three policy variables: dummy variables for IRCA (1 for all 
time periods beginning in 1986, the year of IRCA’s implementation) and NAFTA (1 
beginning in 1994, 0 before), and a continuous variable measuring the percentage change 
in border enforcement expenditures( ) t BE D .   We also include macroeconomic variables: 
the percentage changes between time t and t-1 in the peso-dollar exchange rate ( ) t ER D  
and the US and Mexico GDPs ( ) , t t USGDP MGDP D D .   
(3b)      
1 1 2 3
1 2 3 "
jt j jt t tt t
t t t jt
M t M IRCA NAFTA BE
ER USGDP MGDP u
a g d b b b
q q q
- = + + + + + D
+ D + D + D +
 
Our use of dummy variables to evaluate the impact of NAFTA and IRCA 
warrants some explanation.  Other methods are possible, including controls for trade 
flows or changes in real wages in Mexico and the U.S.  But these variables may not be 
exogenous to migration.  For example, changes in real agricultural wages in the United 
States clearly are related to the supply of migrant labor from rural Mexico.  The inclusion 
of policy dummy variables in the regressions makes it possible to evaluate the long run 
impact of exogenous policy shocks on the rate and dynamic of labor migration. Inclusion 
of the lagged-migration variable allows for the impacts of policy shocks to unfold 
gradually over time.  The vector of fixed effects,  j a ,d ,  3 ,..., 1 , = k k b  and 4 ,..., 1 , = l l q are 
parameters to be estimated, and  jt u ,  jt u', and  jt u"  are stochastic errors.  The use of 
migration shares ( jt M ) instead of differences in migration shares between periods 
( 1 - - jt jt M M ) as the dependent variable allows for the possibility that  1 ¹ d .  Under the 
null hypothesis of no policy impacts on migration the coefficients  0 = k b  " k. 
  We estimate three types of dynamic fixed-effects models for labor migration by 
gender (g = m, f).  The first model is similar to equation (3a).  We estimate the share of 
males (females) in employed migration as a function of a time trend (t) and the lagged 
share of male (female) migrants in village populations: 
(4a)          1 1 " jgt j jgt jt M t M u a g d - = + + +  
We re-estimated each equation including the lagged stock of other-gender migrants to 
evaluate the gender sensitivity of networks:     
(4b)         1 1 2 1 " jsgt j jmt jft jt M t M M u a g d d - - = + + + +              
If both male and female networks shape female migration, then both  1 d  (lagged-female 
migration) and  2 d  (lagged-male migration) will be significant, and conversely for the 
male migration regression.  
In the final estimation we include, in each gender-specific migration equation, all 
our policy and macroeconomic variables. This model is similar to equation (3b) except 
that it includes the lagged stock of other gender’s participation in employed migration: 
(4c)      
1 1 2 1 1 2
3 1 2 3 "
jsgt j jmt jft t t
t t t t jt
M t M M IRCA NAFTA
BE ER USGDP MGDP u
a g d d q q
q b b b
- - = + + + + D + D
+ D + D + D + D +
              8 
 
Estimation and Results 
 
The series of models given by 3(a)-3(b) and 4(a)-4(c) was estimated using the standard 
least square dummy variable (LSDV) method. This method results in a downward bias in 
the estimate of d ; however, this bias diminishes as the number of observations in the 
time dimension (T) increases (Judson and Owen, 1999).  Judson and Owen show that the 
bias becomes negligible as T approaches 30.  In our dataset, T=23 (1980-2002, 
inclusive), which indicates that there will be some bias, but it will be small.   Judson and 
Owen also conclude that when T is greater than 20 the bias in the other parameter 
estimates is negligible. The key hypotheses that we wish to test involve not d , but rather, 
the other parameters in the model (i.e., the effects of policy variables).  
Figure 2 presents estimated shares of populations from the surveyed villages in 
U.S. farm and nonfarm jobs from 1980 to 2002.  It shows an upward trend in migration to 
the United States for both males and females.  However the trend is steeper for males 
than females.
5  Female migration is steady, lower than male migration, and has a steady 
increase over the 23-year period.  Table 2 presents variable definitions and means for 
variables used in the econometrics. 
The data set for this sample provides information on migration from 80 villages 
over 23 years (from 1980 to 2002); however, one year (80 observations) was lost as a 
result of lagged right-hand-side variables.  Thus, the total sample size is 1,760 (22 years x 
80 villages).   
Table 3 reports the econometric results for the village share of labor migrants 
using ordinary least squares, controlling for fixed effects.  Column 1 of Table 3 shows 
results from the model that only controls for the lagged stock of migration.  The time 
trend is significant and positive.  The coefficient on lagged migration is also significant 
and positive, indicating that networks created through past migration influence current 
migration.   
Macroeconomic variables and policies, such as NAFTA and IRCA, can change 
the overall trend and influence of migration rates.  Results from Model 2, which includes 
these variables, are reported in column 2 of Table 3
6.  The time trend and coefficient on 
lagged migration remain positive, large and significant.  The dummy variables for 
NAFTA and IRCA have a significant and negative impact on migration.  Therefore, the 
supply of migrant labor from rural Mexico to the U.S. decreases after the implementation 
of IRCA in 1982, and it decreases once again following NAFTA in 1994.  These findings 
support the hypothesis that NAFTA relieved migration pressures.  IRCA also curtailed 
migration, but to a smaller degree than NAFTA.  In contrast to these policies, the increase 
in border enforcement increased the share of villagers working in the United States.  This 
finding supports the hypothesis that migrants continue to enter the U.S. and/or that 
increased border enforcement discourages return migration. 
                                                 
5 The surge in migration to the United States in the 1990s is mirrored in U.S. Census 2000 data.  The U.S. 
Census does not provide information on where migrants originate in Mexico (e.g., from rural or urban 
areas).  However, they show an unexpectedly large increase in Mexico-born persons living in the United 
States. 
6 Trends in migration may also be influenced by regional dynamics.  When separate repressors are 
estimated for Mexico’s five census regions, there were no differences in the signs of significant variables 
among regions for all of the models presented in this paper.   9 
The macroeconomic variables are all significant and larger in magnitude than the 
policy variables.  The devaluation of the peso increases the rate of migration.  This is of 
the expected sign, inasmuch as the devaluation raises the returns to migration 
(remittances) in pesos.  Changes in both country GDPs increase migration.  Economic 
expansion in the U.S. pulls rural Mexicans into the country.  GDP growth in Mexico 
encourages migration.  This finding is consistent with the argument that income growth 
enables rural households to finance the cost of crossing the border and establishing 
migrants in U.S. labor markets.  
  Gender-specific regression results appear in Table 4, for female migrants, and 
Table 5, for male migrants.  The column labeled “Model I” in each table shows results for 
the basic dynamic regression model.  When we estimate the migration model by gender, 
the trend remains significant and positive but flat.  However, the lagged migration 
participation rate is both statistically and quantitatively significant.  When the lagged 
migration rate of males is added to the estimate of female migration (Model II in Table 
4), it has no significant impact.  That is, there is no evidence of significant cross-gender 
network effects on female migration.  The effect of lagged female migration on male 
migration (Table 5) is positive and significant at the 10% level, but it is quantitatively 
small.  A one-percentage-point increase of the share of village females working in the 
United States, other things being equal, is associated with a .07-percent increase in male  
participation in international migration.  This finding suggests that labor migration 
networks are gender specific.  That is, estimates of a gender’s participation in labor 
migration do not improve appreciably when the other gender’s migration network is 
included in our regressions.   
Macroeconomic and policy variables (Model II in Tables 4 and 5) significantly 
increase the predicative power of the migration models for both genders.
7 Qualitatively, 
policy changes have similar effects on male and female migration, with the exception of 
GDP growth.  However, quantitatively the results differ according to gender. The 
decrease in the male migrant share after NAFTA is three times greater than the drop in 
the female share.  This suggests that female migration was more resilient to NAFTA-
related policy changes.  The decrease in migration shares after implementation of IRCA 
is twice as large for males as females.  Other things being equal, a 1-percent increase in 
U.S. border enforcement has a larger positive percentage effect on male migration than 
on female migration (.022 and .010, respectively).  This indicates either that border 
enforcement increases male stays more than female stays, or perhaps more plausibly, that 
border controls are more of a deterrent to border crossings by females than males. 
  The effects of changes in Mexico’s GDP are significant only for female migration.  
By contrast, changes in US GDP are significant only for male migration.  These findings 
may suggest that female migration is more sensitive to liquidity constraints that can be 
loosened by income growth in Mexico, while female migrant labor demand is robust to U.S. 
GDP growth.  Male migration, on the other hand, appears to be sensitive to U.S. economic 
growth. 
 
                                                 
7 An F test of restricted versus unrestricted regressions, for both male and female migration shares rejected 
the joint hypothesis that the macroeconomic and policy variables were jointly zero.   10 
Limitations and Caveats 
 
Reliance on policy dummy variables and retrospective data to test for effects of policy 
changes on migration raises some questions and concerns that should be kept in mind 
when interpreting the findings presented here.   
It might be argued that policy changes were endogenous responses to increasing 
migration in the period covered by our analysis.  However, the build-up to IRCA was 
gradual and commenced several years prior to the period covered by our analysis.  
Sanctions were enacted by the U.S. House of Representatives twice in the early 1970s but 
subsequently blocked in the Senate.  President Carter proposed sanctions against 
employment of unauthorized immigrants and legalization in 1977.  Following several 
years of debate and the establishment of the Select Commission on Immigration Reform, 
IRCA was finally passed in 1986.  It might also be argued that IRCA was a response to 
economic recession, which in turn could be correlated with immigration.  However, by 
the time IRCA was passed, the early 1980s recession was largely over.  There was more 
unauthorized Mexico-to-U.S. migration after 1982-83 recession, and migration 
accelerated in the 1990s (Martin, 2003, Chapter 7).   
Our analysis uses fixed effects to control for unobserved village characteristics on 
migration.  It might be argued, however, that the effects of IRCA and NAFTA on migration 
probabilities varied across regions.  IRCA’s effects may have been different in rural areas in 
which the prevalence of migration was high prior to the policy’s implementation.  NAFTA’s 
influence on migration may have been different in regions with high agricultural potential or 
high levels of industrialization.  How these regional characteristics might have influenced 
migration is not clear a priori.  For example, the influence of a large manufacturing sector on 
NAFTA’s migration effects could be positive (in the case of internationally competitive 
industries)  or  negative  (in  the  case  of  industries  that  were  protected  by  Mexican  trade 
policies prior to NAFTA).  A high prevalence of migration prior to IRCA could reflect a 
region’s vulnerability to immigration reforms or an enhanced ability to adapt to reforms, for 
example, through amnesty programs. A rich agricultural base could reflect opportunities for 
expanding  agro-exports  post-NAFTA;  however,  labor-saving  technological  change  is 
concentrated  on  high-potential  lands.    To  explore  the  sensitivity  of  policy  findings  to 
regional  conditions,  we  re-estimated  the  model  including,  as  explanatory  variables, 
interactions between: 
 
· IRCA and the share of villagers who were international labor migrants in 1980 
· NAFTA and the share of cultivated land that was irrigated in 1980 
· NAFTA and the share of manufacturing in state GDPs in 1980 
 
We chose 1980 values for these variables to minimize possible endogeneity bias.  In 
no case was an interaction term significant in explaining migration probabilities.  Inclusion 
of these interactions did not qualitatively alter the effects of the policy variables presented 
earlier.  
A number of other economic and policy changes were more or less coincident with 
IRCA and NAFTA.  Foremost among these were the peso devaluation of late 1994 and 
1995 and enactment of a major welfare reform in the United States in 1996.     11 
We attempt to disentangle the effects of currency devaluations from those of policy 
shocks by including changes in the peso-dollar exchange rates in our regression.  The 1994-
95 period saw a sharp increase in this exchange rate.  However, this was not the only period 
of significant devaluation in our time series.  We believe that there is sufficient variation in 
our exchange-rate variable from 1980 to 2002 to control for currency effects.   
Other policies that could have affected immigration were enacted within several 
years of IRCA and NAFTA.  Foremost among these was the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PL 104-193, PRWORA), which singled out 
immigrants.  Most legal immigrants arriving after August 22, 1996 are not eligible for 
federal welfare assistance until they have been in the United States for at least five years, 
and many legal immigrants receiving assistance when PRWORA was enacted lost their 
eligibility for benefits.  Enacted only two years after NAFTA, PRWORA’s effects could 
conceivably contaminate our findings, if restricting immigrants’ access to benefits created a 
deterrent to immigration.  In a study of agricultural counties in California, Green, et al. 
(2003) found that PRWORA reduced the number of adults receiving cash assistance; 
however, controlling for employment and other variables, the estimated effect of the policy 
change was not large.  Borjas (2002) concluded that much of the potential impact of welfare 
reform on immigrants outside of California was undone by the actions of state governments. 
Many states — particularly those with large immigrant populations — chose to offer state-
provided benefits to otherwise ineligible immigrants.  Empirical studies overwhelmingly 
point to employment and wages as the primary drivers of immigration.  These 
considerations raise doubts about the extent to which welfare reform influenced 
immigration. 
Due to mortality, some (mostly older) individuals disappear from our synthetic 
cohorts of migrants and villagers as we go back in time—that is, they are not alive to be 
counted at the time of the survey.  If old villagers are less likely to migrate, this will result in 
an upward bias in the estimated share of villagers in the United States (and thus a downward 
bias in the estimated migration trend), and this bias will be larger the farther back in time 
one goes.  The key question relevant to our analysis is whether this bias alters the estimated 
effect of policy changes on migration.  We explored this possibility by estimating the model 
separately for younger age cohorts of villagers (i.e., those who were 16-35 years old in 1980 
and thus less at risk of being affected by mortality over the study period).  There were no 
significant changes to our econometric findings.  Our findings on the effects of policy 





The impacts of NAFTA, IRCA and increased U.S. border enforcement are ambiguous a-
priori.  Each policy change potentially has both positive and negative influences on 
migration.  In the past, data limitations have made it difficult to test for impacts of policy 
shocks on Mexico-to-U.S. migration dynamics.  The Mexico National Rural Household 
Survey provides retrospective migration histories from a nationally random sample of 
rural Mexicans.  This makes it possible to isolate migration trends and control for place-
of-origin characteristics while measuring the impacts of policy shocks on the share of 
rural Mexicans working in the United States.   12 
Several general findings emerge from our analysis.  First, international labor 
migration from rural Mexico has followed an upward trend from 1980-2002 but is driven 
overwhelmingly by past migration, reflecting the central role of migration networks.  
Second, policy variables significantly influence migration, but not as much as 
macroeconomic variables.  NAFTA and IRCA had some impact on curtailing migration; 
however, increased border enforcement appears to have the opposite effect.  No policies 
are able to counteract the effects of a changing macroeconomic environment.  Third, the 
influences of both policy and macroeconomic variables are small compared with network 
effects embodied in past migration. 
A unique contribution of this analysis is the insight it offers into the dynamics 
underlying female and male migration.  Policy shocks and macroeconomic variables have 
differential effects on female and male migration, quantitatively (in the case of NAFTA 
and IRCA) and in some cases qualitatively (in the case of Mexico and U.S. GDP growth).  
The role of Mexico GDP growth in loosening liquidity constraints on migration appears 
to be more important for females than males, while the impact of U.S. income growth is 
greater for males. 
Although own-gender migration networks are significant and large, cross-gender 
network effects are small or nonexistent.  Past research has suggested that female 
migrants follow males, for example, for purposes of family reunification.  However, we 
find that past labor migration by male villagers has no significant effect on female labor 
migration.  That is, controlling for community effects and long run migration dynamics, 
labor migration networks are gender specific.  Future economic research is warranted on 
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Figure 2: Average Share of Villagers Employed in United States: 1980-2002 Table 1. Migration Summary Statistics for Rural Mexico, by Region 
 Region  Variable  Percentages  Sample Mean  Standard Deviation 
Households with US migrants (%)  7.53%   -  0.26 





   Household Sample Size     372    
Households with US migrants (%)  14.52%   -  0.35 





   Household Sample Size    365    
Households with US migrants (%)  27.75%   -  0.45 





   Household Sample Size     346    
Households with US migrants (%)  12.09%   -  0.33 





   Household Sample Size    339    
Households with US migrants (%)  19.72%   -  0.40 





   Household Sample Size     360    
Households with US migrants (%)  16.22%   -  0.37 





   Household Sample Size     1782    
Source: ENHRUM, 2003      
Table 2. Variable Definitions and Means 
Variable  Description  Mean 
T  Time Trend   11 
USMIG  Share of Villagers 
Employed in U.S.  .0403 
Female Migration  Share of Female Villagers 
Employed in U.S.  .0059 
Male Migration  Share of Male Villagers 
Employed in U.S.  .0344 
% Change ER 
% change in Peso-Dollar 
exchange rate from 
previous year 
11.4 
% Change Border Control 
% change in INS border 
enforcement budget from 
previous year  
13.8 
NAFTA  Dummy variable = 1 
beginning in 1994  0.39 
IRCA  Dummy variable = 1 
beginning in 1986  0.74 
% Change MGDP  % change Mexico per capita 
GDP   2.5 
% Change US GDP  % change US per capita 
GDP   3.0  
  Table 3.   
 OLS Coefficients for three Dynamic Models—Participation in Migration (USMIGt) 
(standard errors in Parenthesis) 
All Regions 
 Variables  Model I  Model II 












NAFTA    -.008 
(.002)** 





  .011 
(.003)** 
% Change 
ER    .015 
(.004)** 
% Change 
MGDP    .034 
(.016)** 
% Change 
US GDP    .051 
(.022)** 
R
2  .947  .948 
Dependent Variable: Weighted total of international workers in village  
All models were estimated with village fixed effects. 
N=1759.  **Significance at .05 level  * Significance at .1 level   18 
 
Table 4. 
OLS Coefficients for three Dynamic Models—Female Participation in Migration (Female 
USMIGt) (standard errors are in parentheses) 
All Regions 
 Variables  Model I  Model II 












Male USMIGt-1    .007 
(.008) 
NAFTA    -.002 
(.001)** 
IRCA    -.001 
(.000)* 
% Change Border 
Control    .002 
(.001)** 
% Change ER    .003 
(.001)** 
% Change MGDP    .011 
(.005)** 
% Change US GDP    .009 
(.007) 
R
2  .882  .883 
Dependent Variable: Weighted total of female international workers in village  
All models were estimated with village fixed effects. 
N=1759. **Significance at .05 level * Significance at .1 level 
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Table 5 
OLS Coefficients for three Dynamic Models—Male Participation in Migration (Male 
USMIGt) 
(standard errors are in parentheses) 
All Regions 
 Variables  Model I  Model II 












Female USMIGt-1    .068 
(.042) 
NAFTA    -.006 
(.002)** 
IRCA    -.002 
(.001)* 
% Change Border 
Control    .010 
(.002)** 
% Change ER    .012 
(.004)** 
% Change MGDP    .023 
(.015) 
% Change US GDP    .042 
(.019)** 
R
2  .947  .948 
Dependent Variable: Weighted total of male international workers in village  
All models were estimated with village fixed effects. 
N=1759. **Significance at .05 level * Significance at .1 level   20 
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